Computational Aspects of Equilibria in Discrete Preference Games by Lolakapuri, Phani Raj et al.
Computational Aspects of Equilibria in Discrete
Preference Games∗
Phani Raj Lolakapuri
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
p.lolakapuri@tifr.res.in
Umang Bhaskar
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
umang@tifr.res.in
Ramasuri Narayanam
IBM, Bangalore, India
ramasurn@in.ibm.com
Gyana R Parija
IBM, Bangalore, India
gyana.parija@in.ibm.com
Pankaj S Dayama
IBM, Bangalore, India
pankajdayama@in.ibm.com
Abstract
We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games
were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC ’13, JCSS ’18) to model decision-
making by agents in a social network that choose a strategy from a finite, discrete set, balancing
between their intrinsic preferences for the strategies and their desire to choose a strategy that is
‘similar’ to their neighbours. There are thus two components: a social network with the agents
as vertices, and a metric space of strategies. These games are potential games, and hence pure
Nash equilibria exist. Since their introduction, a number of papers have studied various aspects
of this model, including the social cost at equilibria, and arrival at a consensus.
We show that in general, equilibrium computation in discrete preference games is PLS-
complete, even in the simple case where each agent has a constant number of neighbours. If
the edges in the social network are weighted, then the problem is PLS-complete even if each
agent has a constant number of neighbours, the metric space has constant size, and every pair of
strategies is at distance 1 or 2. Further, if the social network is directed, modelling asymmetric
influence, an equilibrium may not even exist. On the positive side, we show that if the metric
space is a tree metric, or is the product of path metrics, then the equilibrium can be computed
in polynomial time.
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1 Introduction
Networks are a growing presence in our lives, and affect our behaviour in complex ways. A
large amount of literature attempts to understand various facets of these networks. The
literature is diverse, due to the large variety of networks and their myriad effects on our daily
lives. Prominent among these is the work on opinion formation in social networks [5, 18];
algorithms to target agents in a network to promote adoption of a product [14, 20]; and
models that accurately capture the special structure of social networks [6, 23].
We study a model of opinion formation in social networks. In a basic but commonly
studied model of opinion formation, each agent in the network holds a real-valued opinion,
such as her political leaning, and is influenced by her neighbours in the social network.
Under the influence of her neighbours, in each time step she updates her opinion to the
weighted average of her opinion and that of her neighbours. In a game-theoretic setting, this
is a coordination game, where players try to coordinate their opinion with their neighbours.
Probabilistic models of updation, where the opinions are from the discrete set {0, 1} are also
studied [12]. Much of the work in opinion formation focuses on conditions for consensus,
when all agents eventually hold the same opinion (e.g., [1, 5]). Clearly, however, consensus is
not always attained in social networks, and the basic model has been extended in different
ways to capture this lack of consensus (e.g., [24, 3, 11]).
Further, most work focuses on the case where the opinion of an agent is either binary (in
the set {0, 1}), or in the interval [0, 1]. These are clearly important, since opinions in many
cases (e.g., political leanings, or product adoption) are captured by these sets. However,
often more complex sets are required. As an example, a person’s political leaning is often a
composite of her inclinations on various topics, such as economic inequality, foreign policy,
and the tax regime. A more realistic model would consider a person’s opinion as a composite
of these individual opinions, and update accordingly. As a second example, a person’s opinion
could be a physical location, such as a choice of which neighbourhood to live in. In this
case, the set of strategies would be more complex, and the update process would select the
geometric median of the neighbour locations. Another example would be in understanding
technology adoption from among different platforms such as Android, iOS, Blackberry, etc.
The set of strategies are now discrete points, with distances corresponding to the cost of
switching from one technology platform to another.
We study a particular model for opinion formation called a discrete preference game
[10, 11].1 In this model, an agent can hold one of a finite set of strategies (opinions), and a
distance function gives the distance between any pair of strategies. A natural restriction on
the distance function is that it be a metric, and hence the strategies are points in a metric
space. In addition, each agent has an intrinsic preferred strategy which is fixed. The cost
of each agent for a strategy is the sum of weighted distances to her neighbours and to her
preferred strategy. The presence of preferred strategies leads to the absence of consensus
as an equilibrium in general [21]. Further, the representation of strategies as points in a
metric space allows modelling of many complex situations, beyond the simple settings studied
earlier.
Since their introduction, numerous papers have studied various properties of these games,
including bounding the ratio of the total cost of equilibria to the minimum total cost (called
1 A similar model was concurrently studied by Ferraioli et al. [17], however with binary strategies.
Both these papers give a natural polynomial time algorithm for equilibrium computation with binary
strategies.
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the Price of Anarchy or Stability), as well as generalisations [4, 11]. In a natural updation
process, each player in her turn chooses a strategy that minimizes her cost. While it is known
that this updation process leads to an equilibrium, the number of turns required may be
exponential in the size of the game.
In this work, we study computational aspects of equilibria in discrete preference games.
Equilibrium computation is a fundamental problem in computational game theory, and
the lack of efficient algorithms for this is often viewed as a stumbling block to the notion
of equilibria as a prediction of player behaviour (e.g., [13]). Algorithms for computing
equilibria are also useful, e.g., in simulations to study properties of equilibria, or to obtain
approximations to the global optimum for the underlying distance-minimization problem
(e.g., [8]).
Coordination games on graphs are another model closely related to discrete preference
games [2, 3]. In these games, agents attempt to coordinate with their neighbours, however
the set of strategies available to each player is restricted. The distance between any pair of
strategies is 1, and hence these are similar to discrete preference games with the discrete
metric.
Our Contribution
We present our results informally here. Formal definitions and results are given in later
sections.
We first show that equilibrium computation in discrete preference games is hard, even if
we restrict the number of neighbours that each agent has in the social network.
I Result 1. It is PLS-hard to find an equilibrium in discrete preference games, even when
each player has constant degree in the social network.
If we allow the edges in the social network to be weighted, modelling varying degrees
of influence by the neighbours, then equilibrium computation is hard even with multiple
restrictions on the metric space.
I Result 2. In weighted discrete preference games, it is PLS-hard to compute an equilibrium,
even when each player has constant degree in the social network, the number of strategies is
constant, and the distance between any pair of strategies is one or two.
Our results are interesting because these are examples where equilibrium computation
is hard in a purely coordination game. In previous games where hardness was shown for
equilibrium computation, there were incentives for anti-coordination, i.e., players had an
incentive to choose strategies different from their neighbours (e.g., local max-cut games [22],
congestion games [16], and even coordination-only polymatrix games [9]).
Lastly, we show that if we allow the edges in the social network to be directed, then an
equilibrium may not even exist (and hence, the update process described may cycle).
I Result 3. In a discrete preference game with directed edges, an equilibrium may not exist.
We note that directed edges in social networks are clearly more general, and allow the
model to capture asymmetric influences. E.g., Facebook offers one the ability to ‘follow’
another person, which is an asymmetric method of influence. Both undirected and directed
social networks are commonly studied (e.g., [2, 3, 7, 24]).
In our example to show nonexistence of equilibria, the social network consists of a single
strongly connected component. In coordination games on graphs, it is known that if the social
network has a single strongly connected component then an equilibrium always exists [3].
Our work thus shows this does not hold if we allow more complicated metric spaces.
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We show, however, that in two particular cases, an equilibrium can be computed in
polynomial time.
I Result 4. If the metric space is a tree metric, or is the Cartesian product of path metrics,
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
The case of tree metrics was earlier studied, and bounds shown on the Price of Stability [11].
The authors also motivate tree metrics by an example of students choosing a major in college,
when different subjects follow a hierarchy for proximity. The product metric space roughly
corresponds to the case when the metric space is a regular grid. A natural scenario that is
modelled by the product metric is the case presented in the introduction, where an agent’s
strategy is a composite of a number of individual opinions, and the distance between two
strategies is the sum of distances for each individual opinion.
Our algorithms for these cases are simple, however, they obtain equilibria in substantial
generalizations of discrete preference games as well, when the social network is a weighted
directed graph, and instead of having a single preferred strategy, agents have multiple
preferred strategies with different weights for each. Thus, this result also shows the existence
of equilibria in directed discrete preference games, with these metric spaces.
2 Preliminaries
In the basic model, a discrete preference game consists of an undirected, unweighted neigh-
bourhood graph G = (V,E) representing the social network of n players, and a metric space
L = (L, d) [11]. Here, L is the set of strategies, and d is a distance metric — d is a function
on pairs of strategies that satisfies: (i) d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y, and is positive otherwise, (ii)
d(x, y) = d(y, x), and (iii) d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) + d(y, z). Each player i ∈ V has a preferred
strategy si ∈ L. Since the strategies exist in a metric space, we will also refer to the strategies
as points in the metric space. We will use zi for the strategy of the ith player, z = (z1, . . . , zn)
for a strategy profile, and z−i for the strategies of all players except i.
Given a parameter α ∈ [0, 1) and a strategy profile z, the cost for player i is:
ci(z) = αd(si, zi) + (1− α)
∑
j∈Ni
d(zi, zj) ,
where Ni is the set of neighbours of i, not including i herself. Thus the cost of a strategy
zi for player i is α times the distance from her preferred strategy, plus (1 − α) times the
total distance from her neighbours. Each player tries to minimise her cost, and hence tries
to choose a strategy that is the weighted median of her preferred strategy and the strategies
of her neighbours.
We also study two natural generalisations of the basic model of discrete preference games.
In the first generalisation, we allow weights on the edges of the neighbourhood graphs. This
models the realistic scenario when different neighbours of a player have different levels of
influence on her actions. In this case, for player i, the strategy profile z has cost:
ci(z) = wid(si, zi) +
∑
j∈Ni
wijd(zi, zj) ,
where wi is the weight player i places on her preferred strategy, and wij is the weight on the
undirected edge {i, j} ∈ E.
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In the second generalisation, we allow edges to be directed as well as weighted. This
naturally models the case when influences are asymmetric: e.g., Facebook, in addition to the
option of adding a person as a friend, offers one the ability to ‘follow’ another person, which
is an asymmetric method of influence. In this case, the expression for the cost of player i for
strategy profile z remains unchanged, though the neighbours of player i are those players
that have edges from i in the neighbourhood graph.
An equilibrium is a strategy profile where no player can deviate to a different strategy
and reduce her cost. We are interested in algorithms for computing equilibria in discrete
preference games. In the weighed setting, these games are exact potential games. That is,
for every weighted discrete preference game, there is a potential function Φ of the strategy
profile which has the property that if player i deviates from a strategy profile, then the
change in player i’s cost is exactly the change in the potential function as well. It can be
verified that the potential function for the weighted setting is:
Φ(z) =
∑
i∈V
wid(si, zi) +
∑
{i,j}∈E
wijd(zi, zj) . (1)
A finite potential game always has an equilibrium, since at the minimum of the potential
function, no player has a deviating strategy that reduces her cost. Thus, undirected weighted
discrete preference games always possess an equilibrium. Further, best response dynamics —
where in each step, a player chooses her minimum cost strategy in response to other players,
and deviates to it — converges to an equilibrium, since in each step the potential function
decreases.
However, best-response dynamics may, in general, take exponential time to converge to
an equilibrium. We are interested in efficient algorithms for equilibrium computation, that
for some polynomial p(·) run in time O(p(|I|)) where |I| is the size of input, and returns an
equilibrium. This is the subject of Section 4.
In Section 3 we show that in general, the problem of equilibrium computation is hard,
by showing that even in many simple cases, equilibrium computation is PLS-complete. The
class PLS, for Polynomial Local Search, was introduced to study the complexity of finding a
local minimum for problems where local search can be carried out in polynomial time [19].
Discrete preference games fall in this class, since finding the equilibrium is equivalent to
finding a local minimum for the potential function Φ. The locality of a strategy profile z is
the set of all profiles where a single player deviates. By finding the cost of each deviation,
for each player, we can obtain a solution with lower value for the potential in polynomial
time, if it exists.
A problem is PLS-complete if it is in PLS and is PLS-hard. PLS-hardness of a problem
means that all problems in the class PLS can be polynomially reduced to this problem. Many
problems are by now known to be PLS-complete, including local max-cut, max-2SAT, and
equilibrium computation in congestion games [16, 22].
3 Hardness of Computing Equilibria
We start with two simple cases when an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Firstly, if the parameter α ≤ 1/2, then in any instance where the neighbourhood graph is
connected, the following is an equilibrium: all players choose the same strategy A ∈ L. If
the neighbourhood graph is disconnected, then each isolated player chooses its preferred
strategy, while all players in a connected component choose the same strategy. Secondly, in
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weighted preference games if the weights on the edges as well as the distance between any
two strategies are bounded (above and below) by polynomials in the size of the input I, then
the equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time by best-response dynamics. In this case,
the potential is bounded from above by a polynomial in |I|, and in each best-response step,
the potential also reduces by a polynomial in |I|. Hence best-response dynamics converges
to a local minima of the potential function in polynomial time, which is also an equilibrium.
Despite these results, we show that equilibrium computation is in general hard in discrete
preference games, even in simple settings. Specifically, we show that in the unweighted
setting, for any α > 1/2, computing an equilibrium is PLS-complete even when each player
has constant degree. In the weighted setting, computing an equilibrium is PLS-complete
even when each player has constant degree, the number of strategies is constant, and the
distance between every pair of strategies is either 1 or 2. For directed neighbourhood graphs,
we show that an equilibrium may not even exist.
For the hardness results, we show a reduction from the local max-cut game. In a
local max-cut game, we are given an undirected weighted graph with n vertices. Vertices
correspond to players, and each player has two strategies A and B. The utility of a player
i is the sum of weights of edges to players that choose the strategy different from i, i.e.,
ui(z) =
∑
j∈Ni:zj 6=zi wij . Equilibrium computation in the max-cut game is known to be
PLS-complete, even if each player has degree five [15].
x y
z
w1
w2 w3
Ax
Ay
Az
Bx
By
Bz
xA,1
xA,10
xB,1 xB,10 yA,1 yA,10
yB,1
yB,10
zA,1
zA,10
zB,1
zB,10
x y
z
(a) (b) (c)
W − w1 W − w1
W − w2 W − w2
W − w3 W − w3
Figure 1 An example of the reduction from Theorem 1 (in the theorem, each player has five
neighbours in the max-cut instance). Figure (a) shows the max-cut instance, (b) shows the metric
space in the reduction, and (c) shows the neighbourhood graph. In (b), all pairs of nodes that do
not have an edge displayed between them are at distance W , where W = 5(w1 + w2 + w3).
I Theorem 1. For any α > 1/2 in the unweighted setting, it is PLS-hard to find an
equilibrium in discrete preference games, even when each player has constant degree.
Proof. Given an instance G′ = (V ′, E′) of local max-cut with weights w′ on the edges, we
construct an instance of a discrete preference game where the strategies are in correspondence
with the local max-cut game, and in fact the cost in the discrete preference game is exactly
a constant minus the utility in the max-cut game. Let n′ be the number of players in either
game, and W = 5
∑
e∈E′ w
′
e. We make two assumptions: that each player can be restricted
to a subset of strategies, and that some players do not have a preferred strategy. We first
describe the reduction under these assumptions, and later show how these assumptions can be
removed. With these assumptions, we choose our neighbourhood graph G(V,E) = G′(V ′, E′).
The strategy set L contains two strategies Ai and Bi for each player i. We assume that i
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is restricted to these two strategies. Thus, |L| = 2n′. Finally, if {i, j} ∈ E, then d(Ai, Bj)
= d(Aj , Bi) = W − wij . The distance between any other pair of strategies is W . Thus if
players i and j both play Ai and Aj , or Bi and Bj , their distance is W .
Figure 1 shows the reduction for an instance of max-cut with three vertices x, y and z.
Note first that the set of players is identical in both games. For every strategy profile
z′ in the max-cut game, there is a strategy profile z in the discrete preference game where
player i plays Ai if she plays A in the max-cut game, and plays Bi otherwise. Then it is
easy to see that the cost of player i is ci(z) = 5W − ui(z′). There is thus a correspondence
between strategy profiles in the two games, and the cost in one is a constant minus the utility
in the other. It follows that z′ is an equilibrium in the max-cut game if and only if z (as
constructed above) is an equilibrium in the discrete preference game.
We now discuss how to remove the two assumptions. Our first assumption is that a
player can be restricted to two strategies. To remove this, for each player i, we introduce 20
players: iA,1, . . . , iA,10, and iB,1, . . . , iB,10. We call these auxiliary players. Each of these has
an edge to player i in the neighbourhood graph, and thus has degree 1. Auxiliary players
iA,1, . . . , iA,10 have Ai as their preferred strategy, while auxiliary players iB,1, . . . , iB,10 have
Bi as their preferred strategy. Since they have degree 1, and α > 1/2, the best response for
these players is always to play their preferred strategy. Now note that since each non-auxiliary
player i has degree 25 in the neighbourhood graph, if player i plays either Ai or Bi, her cost
is at most 15W . However if player i plays a strategy other than Ai or Bi, her cost is at
least 20(W −maxe we) ≥ 16W . Hence her best response is always to play either Ai or Bi.
Further, since the auxiliary players for player i are equally distributed with Ai or Bi as the
preferred strategy, their addition does not affect player is choice of strategy between the two,
which depends on the strategies chosen by the non-auxiliary players.
Our last assumption is that the non-auxiliary players do not have a preferred strategy.
This is removed by introducing another point C into the metric space, which has distance W
from all other strategies, and which is the preferred strategy for all non-auxiliary players.
However, if α is very large, then it would be an equilibrium for all players to choose C. To
fix this, increase the number of auxiliary players for each player i from 20 to d20α/(1− α)e.
It can be checked that in this case, player is best response is always to play either Ai or Bi.
We note that, each player now has degree at most d5 + 20α/(1− α)e, which is a constant for
fixed α. J
We now show that if the edges in the neighbourhood graph are weighted, equilibrium
computation is hard even in simpler settings.
I Theorem 2. In the weighted setting, it is PLS-hard to compute an equilibrium, even when
each player has constant degree in the neighbourhood graph, the strategy set has constant size,
and the distance between any pair of strategies is either one or two.
Proof. As before, given an instance G′ = (V ′, E′) of local max-cut with weights w′ on the
edges and degree five for each vertex, we construct an instance of a discrete preference
game where the strategy profiles are in correspondence with the local max-cut instance. Let
n′ = |V ′| be the number of players and W = 5∑e∈E′ w′e. We first describe the reduction
under the assumption that each player can choose one of only two strategies, and later show
how the assumption can be enforced without loss of generality. With this assumption, we
choose our weighted neighbourhood graph G(V,E,w) = G′(V ′, E′, w′).
To construct the metric space, we use the fact that a graph of maximum degree five can
be properly coloured by a greedy algorithm with six colours. That is, every vertex in the
graph can be assigned one of six colours, so that if vertices u, v are adjacent in the graph,
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then they are assigned different colours. Thus, the neighbourhood graph can be coloured
with six colours. Let κ(v) denote the colour assigned to vertex v ∈ V . Let a, b, c, d, e, and
f be the six colours used.
Our metric space L consists of 12 strategies, {A,B} × {a, b, c, d, e, f}. We call the first
component the parity of the strategy, and the second component the colour of the strategy.
The distance between two points is 1 if the parity of the points is different, and is 2 otherwise.
We assume that each player i is restricted to the two strategies in the metric space coloured
κ(i). Note that this means that for a player i, since all of her neighbours have a different
colour, they cannot be at the same point in the metric space as i. Hence the cost of i is at
least
∑
j∈Ni wij . Further, it is easily seen that in any strategy profile, the cost of a player i
is 2
∑
j∈Ni wij minus the weight of the neighbours of i that play the parity different from i’s
strategy.
For every strategy profile z′ in the max-cut game, there is a strategy profile z in the
discrete preference game where player i plays (A, κ(i)) if she plays A in the max-cut game,
and plays (B, κ(i)) otherwise. Then the cost of player i in the discrete preference game is
ci(z) = 2
∑
j∈Ni wij − ui(z′). There is thus a correspondence between strategy profiles in the
two games, and the cost in one is (a constant plus) the negative of the utility in the other. It
follows that z′ is an equilibrium in the max-cut game if and only if z (as constructed above)
is an equilibrium in the discrete preference game.
We remove the assumption in a manner similar to the previous proof, though since the
neighbourhood graph is weighted we require fewer auxiliary players. For each existing player
i, we introduce 2 new players iA and iB , called auxiliary players. These players have an edge
from player i in the neighbourhood graph with weight W := 10
∑
e∈E we. Each auxiliary
player thus has degree 1. Then auxiliary player iA has (A, κ(i)) as its preferred strategy
with weight 11W , and iB has (B, κ(i)) as its preferred strategy with weight 11W . Notice
that: (1) Since the auxiliary players have degree 1 with an edge of weight 10W incident,
while the weight they place on their preferred strategy is 11W , they will always play their
preferred strategy. (2) By a simple calculation as in the previous proof, the best response for
player i is always to play either (A, κ(i)) or (B, κ(i)). The symmetry of the auxiliary players
implies that their presence does not affect the choice of (A, κ(i)) or (B, κ(i)) for player i.
This completes the proof. J
We now give an example for a directed neighbourhood graph where an equilibrium does
not exist. As before, we first describe our example under the assumption that we can
restrict players to a subset of strategies, and then introduce auxiliary players to remove this
assumption.
I Example 3. With the assumption that we can restrict players to a subset of the strategies,
the neighbourhood graph and the metric space for our example are shown in Figure 2. There
are three players x0, x1, and x2. In the neighbourhood graph, player xi has an edge to
xi+1 mod 3 (in this example, we always assume i+ 1 is taken mod 3 to avoid repetition). The
metric space consists of 6 strategies, {0, 1, 2} × {a, b}. We think of the second coordinate as
the ‘parity’, and strategies as nodes in a complete bipartite graph with 6 vertices, with any
two strategies of the same parity at distance 2, while any two strategies of different parities
at distance 1. By our assumption, we restrict player xi to strategies (i, a) and (i, b).
From the neighbourhood graph, player xi wants to be near player xi+1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
However, in the metric space, for any (restricted) choice of strategy for xi+1, the strategy of
xi that is nearest has the opposite parity. Hence each player xi tries to choose a strategy of
the opposite parity from player xi+1, and hence there is no equilibrium.
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x0
x1x2
(0, a)
(1, a)
(2, a)
(0, b)
(1, b)
(2, b)
(a) (b)
1
1
11
1 1
11
1
Figure 2 The example for non-existence of equilibria in directed discrete preference games.
Figure(a) shows the neighborhood graph and (b) shows the metric space.
Lastly, to remove the assumption of strategy restrictions, for each player xi, we add ten
new players (xi, 1), . . . , (xi, 10). In the neighbourhood graph each player xi has an edge to
the ten new players (xi, j), and the game now has 33 players. For each i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the first
five new players (xi, 1) . . . (xi, 5) have (i, a) as their preferred strategy, while the other five
have (i, b) as their preferred strategy. Since the newly added players only have incoming
edges, they always choose their preferred strategy. Then for each player xi, choosing a
strategy from the set {(i, a), (i, b)} gets cost 5 from the auxiliary players, and cost at most 4
from the other two non-auxiliary players. Whereas, any different strategy for player i gets
cost at least 15 from the auxiliary players. Hence player xi will always choose from the set
{(i, a), (i, b)} at equilibrium. Since the newly added players are symmetric between these
two strategies, they do not further affect xi’s choice of strategy.
4 Algorithms for Computing Equilibria
We now give efficient algorithms for computing equilibria in discrete preference games with
restrictions on the metric space. However, we allow a significant generalization of the
neighbourhood graph. We allow directed, weighted neighbourhood graphs, where instead of
a preferred strategy, players have a penalty associated with each point in the metric space.
Formally, for each node v in the metric space and each player i, there is a real-valued penalty
pi(v). The cost for player i for the strategy profile z = (zi, z−i) is
ci(z) =
∑
v∈L
pi(v)d(v, zi) +
∑
j∈Ni
wijd(zi, zj) .
Our results thus show that in the metric spaces discussed below, equilibria exist, even in
the case of directed neighbourhood graphs. E.g., this shows that equilibria exist in the case
of path metrics.
We discuss metric spaces in more detail now. Any undirected weighted graph on r vertices
corresponds to a metric space with r points, where every vertex is a point, and the distance
between any pair of points is the weight of the minimum weight path in the graph between
the corresponding vertices. Such a metric space is a graph metric. Further, any finite metric
space on r points can be represented as a graph metric, by considering the complete graph on
58:10 Computational Aspects of Equilibria in Discrete Preference Games
r vertices where the weight of the edge between any pair of vertices is the distance between
them.
We first give an algorithm for when the graph metric is a tree, with positive lengths le on
the edges. Note that this contains the special case when the graph metric is a path. We then
generalise path metrics in another direction, by considering the Cartesian product of path
metrics. This product metric intuitively is obtained when the graph for the metric space is a
regular grid.
4.1 An algorithm for tree metrics
Algorithm 1 Tree Metric Algo
Require: Discrete preference game (G = (V,E,w), T = (L, d)) where T is a tree metric
with root r.
1: Initially, let zi ← r for each player i.
2: while ∃ player i that can reduce her cost by moving to a child v of zi do zi ← v.
Our algorithm for tree metrics initially places all players at the root. If any player
can improve her cost by moving to a child of her current strategy, the algorithm changes
her strategy accordingly. In a metric space with n points, the algorithm terminates in
pn iterations of the while loop where p is the number of points, and hence terminates in
polynomial time. We now show that when it terminates, the strategy profile is an equilibrium.
To prove convergence, we first characterise the best response. Fix a player i and strategies
z−i for the other players. For any node v in the tree, let w(v) be the weight of i’s neighbours
j ∈ Ni that have zj = v, plus i’s penalty pi(v) for point v. This gives us a tree T with
weights on the nodes. We say that cost of node u in the tree is the total weighted distance
to the other nodes, i.e., c(u) =
∑
v∈T w(v) d(u, v). The set of minimum cost nodes in the
weighted tree are called the medians of the tree, and are the best responses for player i, since
c(u) = ci(z) if zi = u.
We will use the following result which further characterises the medians. Given weights
w(v) at the nodes, let w(T ) be the total weight at the nodes of the tree, and T − v be the
graph obtained by removing node v.
I Claim 1 ([11]). A node u is the median of a tree iff the weight of each connected component
of T − v is at most w(T )/2.
We also use the following claim.
I Claim 2. Given a tree T with weights at the nodes, let v be an arbitrary vertex and v∗ be
a median nearest to v. Then the cost of the nodes strictly decreases on the path from v to
v∗.
Proof. Let (v∗ = v0, v1, . . . , vt = v) be the path from v∗ to v. Note that c(v1) > c(v0), since
vi is not a median for i > 0. Also, all of these nodes (except v0, which is the median) are in
the same connected component in T − v∗, and the total weight of nodes in this component is
≤ w(T )/2. Now consider any node vi for i > 1. We know that the subtree rooted at vi has
total weight at most w(T )/2 (since it is in the same component in T − v∗). Since vi−1 is not
a median, the subtree rooted at vi must have total weight strictly less than w(T )/2. Moving
from vi to vi−1 increases the distance from every node in this subtree by the length of the
edge (vi−1, vi), and decreases the distance from every other node by this quantity, and hence
decreases the cost. J
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We now prove convergence of the algorithm.
I Theorem 4. The Tree Metric Algo terminates at an equilibrium.
Proof. Let z be the strategy profile when the algorithm terminates. Suppose for a contra-
diction that for player i, zi = v, while z′i = v∗ is a nearest best response(and so a median)
with lower cost. In the following, we consider the weighted tree T with edge lengths as in
the metric space, and weights on the nodes, where for any node v in the tree the weight
w(v) =
∑
j∈Ni:zj=v wij +pi(v). As earlier, the cost of a node v in the tree is the total
weighted distance to the other nodes
Let (v∗ = v0, v1, . . . , vt = v) be the path from v∗ to v, then by Claim 2, the cost strictly
increases along this path, and c(vt−1) < c(v). Since the algorithm terminates, vt−1 must be
v’s parent, hence v 6= r. Let T (v) be the subtree rooted at v. Consider the timestep when
player i moved from vt−1 to v. Note that this decreases i’s distance from every node in T (v)
by lvt−1,v, and increases the distance from every other node by the same length. Since this
move decreased i’s cost, at that time, the total weight of i’s neighbours in T (v) must have
been at least w(T )/2. Since that time step, players have only moved away from the root,
and hence in particular any player that was in T (v) at that timestep must still be in T (v),
and hence when the algorithm terminates, the weight of i’s neighbours in T (v) must be at
least w(T )/2. However, since v∗ is a median, the weight of i’s neighbours in T (v) is also at
most w(T )/2. Thus v must also be a median, giving us a contradiction. J
4.2 An algorithm for the Cartesian product of path metrics
We now give an algorithm for equilibrium computation if the metric space is the Cartesian
product of path metrics. As discussed, a path metric P = (L, d) can be represented as a path.
Alternatively, a path metric can be embedded in the real number line so that the distance
between two points is the absolute difference in their values of their embedding.
A metric space P = (L, d) is the Cartesian product of path metrics P1 = (L1, d1), . . .,
Pr = (Lr, dr) (or a product metric, for brevity) if L = L1 × . . . × Lr, and for any two
points x = (x1, . . . , xr) and y = (y1, . . . , yr) in L, the distance d(x, y) =
∑r
i=1 di(xi, yi).
Alternatively, P is the Cartesian product of r path metrics if it can be embedded in Rr,
so that the distance between any two points is the L1 distance of their embeddings, and
whenever (x1, . . . , xr) and (y1, . . . , yr) are points in the embedding, so are the 2r {x1, y1}
× . . .× {xr, yr}.
For a discrete preference game on a product metric, for each player i, her strategy zi is a
vector, with the tth coordinate zi,t denoting her position in the path metric Pt.
For the algorithm, we first characterize equilibria. Given a discrete preference game with
product metric P and a strategy profile z, we say player i is playing her partial best response
in the tth metric if she is at a median in the path metric Pt (we defined the set of medians
earlier, for tree metrics). Note that a player may have multiple best responses.
I Claim 3. Player i is playing her best response iff she is playing her partial best response in
each metric t ∈ [r].
Proof. The claim is because the distance between two points in the product metric space
d(x, y) =
∑r
i=1 di(xi, yi) is the sum of distances along the individual metric spaces. Further,
the position in each path metric can be chosen independently. Hence a player minimizes her
cost if and only if she minimizes her cost in each component path metric, i.e., she plays a
partial best response in each path metric Pt for t ∈ [r]. J
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Algorithm 2 Product Metric Algo
Require: Discrete preference game (G = (V,E,w),P = (K, d)) where P is the Cartesian
product of path metrics P1, . . ., Pr.
1: Initially, let zi ← si for each player i.
2: for k ∈ [r] do
3: Use algorithm Tree Metric Algo to obtain an equilibrium for the players in the path
metric Pk.
4: For each player, set zi,k to her position in Pk in the equilibrium computed.
Since the Tree Metric Algo terminates in polynomial time, so does the Product Metric
Algo.
I Theorem 5. The Product Metric Algo terminates at an equilibrium.
Proof. Let z be the strategy profile when the algorithm terminates. For each player i, the
tth component zi,t is set in the tth iteration of the for loop, and after this iteration each
player is playing a partial best response in Pt. By Claim 3, after the last iteration of the for
loop, the strategy profile is an equilibrium. J
Conclusion
Our work is the first to study the basic question of efficient equilibrium computation in discrete
preference games. We show that despite incentivizing coordination, in general equilibrium
computation is PLS-hard. However with restrictions on the metric space, equilibrium may be
computed in polynomial time, even in very general settings for the neighbourhood graph. Our
work is a first step, and leaves open many interesting problems. As an example, for what other
metric spaces can we find an equilibrium efficiently? Another interesting direction would be
to place restrictions on the neighbourhood graph to better represent real-life social networks,
and study if these make equilibrium computation any easier. With the growing popularity
of this and other models of opinion formation, we feel these are important, fundamental
questions.
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